Steven D. Walton, And Ursula Walton, Douglas P. Holbrook, and Suzanne M. Holbrook v. State of Utah : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
Steven D. Walton, And Ursula Walton, Douglas P.
Holbrook, and Suzanne M. Holbrook v. State of
Utah : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Philip C. Pugsley; Watkiss & Campbell; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Stephen C. Ward; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent, Utah State Road Commission; Robert W. Adkins; Attorney for Third-Party
Defendant-Summer County Courthouse; Joseph Novak; Attorney for Third-Party Defendant,
Summit Park, Inc..
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Walton v. Utah, No. 197614532.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/367
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN D. WALTON and URSULA 
WALTON, his wife; DOUGLAS P. 
HOLBROOK and SUZANNE M. 
HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
SUMMIT COUNTY and SUMMIT 
PARK, INC., 
Third-Party 
Defendants-Respondents, 
CASE NO. 14532 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS, STATE OF UTAH, 
BY AND THROUGH ITS ROAD COMMISSION, AND THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, 
DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
F I L E D 
AUG 5 - 1976 
0 * i $upr~* Court, 
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
315 East Second South 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. WARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
Utah State Road Commission 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-
Respondent, Summit County 
Summit County Courthouse 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendant, Summit Park, Inc. 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN D. WALTON and URSULA 
WALTON, his wife; DOUGLAS P. 
HOLBROOK and SUZANNE M. 
HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
SUMMIT COUNTY and SUMMIT 
PARK, INC., 
Third-Party 
Defendants-Respondents, 
CASE NO. 14532 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENTS, STATE OF UTAH, 
BY AND THROUGH ITS ROAD COMMISSION, AND THIRD-
PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, 
DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
315 East Second South 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN C. WARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, 
Utah State Road Commission 
115 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-
Respondent, Summit County 
Summit County Courthouse 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
JOSEPH NOVAK 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendant, Summit Park, Inc. 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT' S MOTION TO DISMISS 4 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT DID 
NOT ERROR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT" S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 8 
POINT III: THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS ' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR 
COMPLAINT 15 
POINT IV: THE DISTRICT COURT 
ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE MOTION 
TO CHANGE VENUE WHICH WAS FILED BY 
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, 
SUMMIT COUNTY 16 
CONCLUSION 17 
CASES CITED 
Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 30 Utah 
2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973) 5 
Hampton v. Utah State Road Commission, 21 
Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968) 5 
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 
907 5 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 
P. 2d 105 5 
Springville Banking Company v. Burton, 10 Utah 
2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 6 
Anderson Investment Corp. v. State of Utah, 
28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144 6 
Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 
488 P.2d 741 (1971) 9 
-i-
Page 
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 
P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) 10 
Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 
(1973) 11 
Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp. v. 
Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 
(1972) 11 
Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. Co., 249 P. 
1036, 1039-40 (1926) 12 
Power Farms Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., 
119 P. 2d 717 (Cal. 1941) 15 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1 through 63-30-34 
(1953) , as amended 6 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-6 and 63-30-3 (1953), 
as amended 6 
Utah Code Ann. 78-11-9, (1953) 9 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-6, (1953), as amended 9 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-1, et seq. (1967)— 10 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-12 10 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-12, (1953) 11 
Utah Code Ann. 78-12-26, (1953) 16 
Utah Code Ann. 78-13-1, (1953), as amended 17 
TREATISES CITED 
C.J.S. 54, Limitations on Actions, Sec. 169, 
p. 128 14 
-ii-
fHE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STE VEN D WALTON and URSULA 
;-i": ., his wife; DOUGLAS P. 
HOLBROOK and SUZANNE M. 
HOLBROOK, his wife 
P t —i anin, 
~vs-
STATE OF UTAH,
 tJ1 and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party 
Plainti f f-Responaei -1., 
-vs-
SUMMi. i CaJIV * SI (MM FT 
PARK, I N C . , 
T h i r d - P c i r t v 
D e f e n d a n t s - R e s p o n d e r t s 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT uj< 11 IK CASK 
This action was !»rouoi bv * he plaintiffs* 
appel 1 ants i ^-nr1 * * x r^ r- iamaars i 
allegedly destroyiny access LO : « JL; -.:.'j-
of their property. 
u^ n^pi'T'T(Vv *,w • »vvf ;;: "OURT 
The or . ,,. . . 
case was servo* he defendant-respondent >• 
28th day of August, 1974, (R-lOf. The defendant-
respondent filed a motion to dismiss and accompanying 
memorandum and affidavit on the first day of October, 
1974. (R-14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20). This motion came 
up for hearing on the 22nd day of October, 1974 (R-24) 
before Judge Jeppson who denied the defendant-respondent's 
motion to dismiss. Subsequently the defendant-respondent 
filed on the 25th day of October, 1974, a motion to 
reconsider (R-25) which was heard by Judge Bryant Croft 
on the 21st day of July, 1975. (R-29). Judge Croft 
denied defendant-respondent's motion to reconsider. 
(R-30, il). Shortly thereafter a petition for interlocutory 
appeal was filed with the Supreme Court of Utah. (R-32-43). 
Subsequently the Supreme Court sent notice that said 
interlocutory appeal was denied. On the 30th day of 
October, 1975, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a motion 
to amend their complaint so as to include Douglas and 
Suzanne Holbrook as party plaintiffs. (R-48). Judge 
Croft granted plaintiffs-appellants' motion to amend their 
complaint on the 10th day of November, 1975. (R-53)6 
The defendant-respondent then filed their 
motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum 
on the 29th day of January, 1976. (R-91-94 and 99-105). 
Judge Sawaya granted the defendant-respondent's motion 
for summary judgment on the 26th day of February, 1976. 
(R-124, 125). 
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It is from this judgment that plaintiffs-appellants 
instituted their appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent, State of Utah, by and 
through the Road Commission and third-party defendant-
respondent, Summit County, seek an affirmance of the 
summary judgment in their favor which was granted by the 
Honorable Judge James Sawaya. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiffs-appellants were the owners 
of lots 12 and 14 on plat "E" of the Summit Park sub-
division which is located just east of the top of 
Parleys Summit in Summit County, Utah, 
In 1970 and 1972 (R-114) the defendant-
respondent started acquiring various parcels of property in 
the Summit Park area. The parcels of ground were 
acquired for the purpose of widening 1-80 and resurfacing 
of Summit Drive. Originally it was planned to use Summit 
Drive as a detour road during the construction of 1-80. 
(R-22). The cul-de-sac on which the plaintiffs-appellants1 
lots are located goes off in a westerly direction off 
Summit Drive. (R-3). 
In September of 19 74, the defendant-respondent 
completed the resurfacing of Summit Drive. (R-94). 
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No property was acquired from the plaintiffs-
appellants to enable the defendant-respondent to 
resurface Summit Drive. (R-17). 
In August of 1971, the defendant-respondent, 
State of Utah, by and through its Road Commission, 
entered into a lease with the third-party defendant-
respondent, Summit County. (R-85). The land was 
adjacent on the east to the plaintiffs-appellants, Waltons' 
property. The particular tract of land covered by this 
lease is the remainder of a lot that was purchased by 
the defendant-respondent. (R-114)« Summit County then 
proceeded to locate an equipment and maintenance shed 
on the property located directly to the east of the 
plaintiffs-appellants, Waltons', lot. The shed houses 
maintenance and fire protection equipment for the protec-
tion of the homes and maintenance of the roads in 
Summit Park subdivision. (R-86). 
That at no time prior to the filing of this 
action did the plaintiffs-appellants serve written notice 
on the defendant-respondent, Utah State Road Commission, 
and the Office of the Attorney General. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants1 action for the recovery 
of alleged damages to their property caused 
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by the resurfacing of Summit Park is barred by the 
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. The issue has been 
before the Utah Supreme Court repeatedly and only 
recently in the case of Holt v. Utah State Road 
Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973) was 
ruled upon by the Court. In the Holt case, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the access restriction amounted 
to a taking and that under the ruling of Hampton v. 
Utah State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 
708 (1968), they were entitled to damages. 
The plaintiff in the Holt case urged the 
Supreme Court to decide the case on the precedent 
of the Hampton case. It is noted, however, that in 
the Holt decision no mention is made of the Hampton 
case. It is also noted that the Court did state: 
" . . . The law has long been established 
in this State that under those circumstances 
(changing of grade and access impairment) 
there can be no recovery from the State for 
damages because the construction of a highway 
may impair or adversely affect the convenience 
of access to property. Sufficient has been 
said as to the pro and con of this subject 
that we think it unnecessarily and undesirable 
to extenuate thereon. But refer to the 
adjudicated cases.11 Holt v. Utah State Road 
Comission, Supra, (words in brackets mine) 
The Court then referred to the cases 
supporting the above stated proposition which include 
Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907; 
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 Utah 2d 417, 354 
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Po2d 105, Springville Banking Company v. Burton, 
10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 and Anderson Investment 
Corp. v. State of Utah, 28 Utah 2d 379, 503 P.2d 144. 
In the Holt case, reference to Hampton v. State Road 
Commission is conspicuously absent* Defendant submits 
that the Hjorth case and the Fairclough case are 
still good law and the cases of Anderson Investment 
and Holt support this position. 
It is apparent that the Hampton case has 
been so limited in its scope that it should only 
apply to cases of identical factual situations. The 
instant case involves a widening and change of 
grade almost identical to the Hjorth, Fairclough and 
Holt case and cases cited therein are, defendant 
submits, dispositive of the instant case. 
'the Court in the Holt case also dealt with 
the applicability of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
Section 63-30-1 through 63-30-34, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended). The Court cited Section 63-30-6 
and 63-30-3 of the Act and concluded: 
,fIn considering the possible application 
of the foregoing statute to the problem 
presented it is pertinent to note that Section 
63-30-3 of the Act expressly provides for a 
continuance of sovereign immunity 'Except as may 
be otherwise provided in this Act . . . 
for any injury which may result from . . . the 
exercise . . . of a governmental function,' 
this seems to indicate that the Act be strictly 
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applied to preserve sovereign immunity; and 
to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. 
It is our opinion that reading Section 6 in 
the light of that rule, the waiver of immunity 
from suit 'for the recovery of any property real 
or personal or for the possession thereof' 
cannot be construed to include an action of 
this character to recover damages for incon-
venience of access to property, nor as changing 
the law as set forth in the cases cited 
herein." Holt v. State Road Commission, Supra. 
It is clear from the above statement that 
the Governmental Immunity Act does not allow recovery 
in cases such as the one pending before this court. 
It is also clear from the last sentence of the 
portion of the Holt case above cited that the law 
was not changed by the Hampton case and that the 
Hjorth, Pairclough, Anderson Investment and other 
cases supporting sovereign immunity represent the 
present law. 
It is to be noted plaintifffs contention 
that the instant case differs from the cases denying 
recovery in that an allegation is made that the access 
impairment constitutes a "taking" and therefore, the 
Hampton case should control. The same contention was 
made in both the Anderson Investment case and the 
Holt case. The allegation that the State's impairment 
of access constituted a taking in these two cases was 
not sufficient to overcome a Motion to Dismiss. It is 
also noted that, according to appellant's brief, in the 
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Holt case, the dismissal was made even though no 
evidence had been taken. 
"The record is extremely handicapped 
in view of the fact that there has been 
no evidence taken in support of plaintiff's 
Complaint." (P.12 of appellant's brief). 
Defendant-appellant concludes by submitting 
that in cases where there has been no physical taking 
of an abutting owners property an action for damages 
cannot be sustained because of the Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity as expressed in the cases cited herein, 
Hampton v. State Road Commission, notwithstanding. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The major case which the plaintiff-
respondent relies upon is Hampton v. State Road 
Commission, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968). 
The Hampton case was instituted prior to the enactment 
of the Utah Waiver of Iiranunity Act, which was in July 
of 1966. In fact, the Hampton case specifically held: 
"• o • Consistently and historically 
we have ruled that the State may not be sued without 
its consent, taken the view that Article I, 
Section 22 of our Constitution is not self 
executing, nor does it give consent to be 
sued, implied or otherwise; and that to 
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secure such consent is a legislative matter, a 
principle recognized by the legislature 
itself. . ." (Emphasis added). 
The court went on to allow suit under 
Section 78-11-9, Utah Code Annotated (1953), which 
with the passage of the Waiver of the Sovereign 
Immunity Act, was repealed and replaced by Section 
63-30-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. The 
Supreme Court interpreted Section 63-30-6 in the Holt 
case, Supra. In the Holt case the court strictly con-
strued 6 3-30-6 and preserved the defendant-respondent's 
sovereign immunity. 
Arguendo, if the plaintiffs-appellants have 
a cause of action, they must follow the procedure as 
outlined in the Waiver of the Sovereign Immunity Act, 
Sections 63-30-1 through 34, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
In neither the plaintiff-respondent's original complaint 
nor in their amended complaint is there an allegation 
as to compliance with the necessary requirements of 
the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Act. (R-l and 50). 
The plaintiffs-appellants were required 
to give written notice of claim within one year after 
the cause of action arose. 
In Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 
2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971), the Utah Supreme Court 
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considered a suit for damages against the State for 
changing the drainage pattern of surface water. The 
court there held that such an action constituted an 
action for private nuisance, and that it was included 
within the waiver of immunity under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 63-30-1, et seg. (1967). That Act provides 
specific time limits for notice to governmental 
entities after a cause of action arises. Section 
63-30-12 provides: 
"A claim against the State or any 
agency thereof as defined herein shall 
be forever barred unless notice thereof 
is filed with the Attorney General of 
the State of Utah and the agency concerned 
within one year after the cause of action arises." 
In Scarborough v. Granite School District, 
531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined the elements of a proper notice of Claim* 
The court there said: 
"We have consistently held that where a 
cause of action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a condi-
tion precedent to the right to maintain a 
suit. In order to so meet the requirements of 
the statute quoted above and fulfill its 
intended purpose, the "filing" of a claim 
should include these essentials: that it be 
in writing; that it contain a brief state-
ment of the facts and the nature of the claim 
asserted; that it be subscribed by the party 
required to give it and who intends to rely 
on it; that it be directed to or responsible 
for receiving it; and that this be done within 
the prescribed time. "531 P.2d at 482. 
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The Supreme Court specifically held in 
that case that an oral notice would not comply with 
the statute. The court has also held that actual 
knowledge by the governmental entity or an inves-
tigation by the governmental entity would not comply 
with the statute. Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 
506 P.2d 435 (1973). 
Furthermore, the fact that notice was 
given must be alleged in the complaint. In 
Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp. v. Holman, 
28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972), the court held: 
"A prerequisite in pursuing a claim 
against the State or its officers is a 
compliance with Section 63-30-12, U.C.A. 
1953, which reads as follows: 
A claim against the state or 
any agency thereof as defined 
herein shall be forever barred 
unless notice thereof is filed with 
the Attorney General of the State 
of Utah and the agency concerned within 
one year after the cause of action 
arises. 
It appears that the plaintiffs complaint 
is fatally defective m that it does not 
allege compliance with that section." (R-10). 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case no notice was given until 
August 28, 1974, which is the date of the service 
of summons in this case. (R-10). This is 
despite the fact the road in question was completed 
some two years earlier. (R-94). No notice was 
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alleged in the complaint. Plaintiffs1 claim is, 
therefore, barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The time for the filing of plaintiffs-
appellants' notice of claim expired as of September, 
19 73. The road in question having been completed in 
September of 1972 (R-94). 
The case of Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Cent. Ry. 
Co., 249 P. 1036, 1039-40 (1926), defines the law in 
Utah as to limitations of actions where there are 
continuing damages. There the plaintiff brought 
an action for damages to her property resulting from 
the construction and continued operation of a nearby 
railroad. She based her claim on nuisance, and on 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, 
asserting that her property had been "taken" or 
"damaged" within the meaning of the Constitution. 
The trial court found that although the injuries 
complained of were compensable, the plaintiff Is. 
claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations and 
directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal she 
claimed that because the damages complained of were of 
a continuing nature and were increasing, the Statute 
of Limitations did not barr her claim. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court in the following 
language: 
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"Where the wrong done by the railroad 
company is temporary in its naturef as in 
leaving cars unnecessarily on its track, or 
while engaged in the work of laying down its 
track, something existing today and not tomorrow, 
fluctuating in extent and depending on the ever-
repeated action of the company, only such 
damages as have fully accrued prior to the 
commencement of the suit are recoverable, and 
none based upon any presumed continuance or 
repetition of the wrong. 
But where the wrong is of a permanent 
nature and springs from the manner in which 
the track, as fully completed, affects 
approach to the lot, then, notwithstanding 
the right which the state retains to control 
the manner of use of a highway by a railroad 
company, even if deemed necessary to compel an 
entire removal of its track, the lot owner 
may treat the act of the company as a permanent 
appropriation of the right of access to his 
lot, and recover as damages the consequent 
depreciation in value of the lot. 
. . .when the original nuisance is of 
a permanent character so that the damage 
inflicted thereby is of a permanent character, 
and goes to the entire destruction of the estate 
affected thereby or will be likely to continue 
for an indefinite period, and during its 
existence deprive the landowner of any 
beneficial use of that portion of his estate, 
a recovery not only may, but must be had for 
the entire damage in one action, as the damage 
is deemed to be original; and as the entire 
damage accrues from the time the nuisance is 
created and only one recovery can be had, the 
statute of limitations begins to run from the time 
of its erection against the owner of the 
estate or estates affected thereby."(Emphasis 
added). 
Thus, where the injury, although continuous, 
is caused by a permanent structure or will likely 
continue indefinitely, there is but one cause of 
action arising from it, and the limiting statute 
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commences to run at the time the injury begins. 
The plaintiffs-appellants allege the 
damage was caused by the resurfacing and widening of 
an access road, a permanent structure. Plaintiffs1 
sole cause of action for such injuries arose, at the 
latest in September of 1972, upon the completion 
of the road. The statutory period for filing a 
claim has long since expired. 
Corpus Juris Secundum supports the rule 
established by the Utah courts. At 54 C.J.S. 
Limitations on Actions, Sec. 169, p. 128, it defines 
the term "permanent structure" as follows: 
"A permanent structure as respects 
running of the Statute of Limitations has 
been defined as one which may not be 
readily remedied, removed, or abated at a 
reasonable expense or one of a durable 
character evidently intended to last 
indefinitely." 
* * * 
"Where the case is such that all damages, 
both past and future can be presently estimated 
and recovered in one action, successive actions 
cannot be brought for recurring or continuing 
damages, and the statute runs from the time 
the original cause of action accrues." 
* * * 
"An action for injuries to land from 
water seeping from a property constructed 
irrigation ditch which is intended to be 
permanent constitutes a single cause of 
action, and as affected by the Statute of 
Limitations accrues at the beginning of the 
injury." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, 
Sec. 173. (Emphasis added). 
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The law in other jurisdictions is also 
in agreement with the Utah law. 
In Power Farms Inc. v. Consolidated Irr. 
Dist., 119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941), the plaintiff brought 
an action for damages caused by water seepage. 
A judgment in favor of the plaintiff was rendered 
by the trial court. The California Supreme Court, 
however, found that the plaintiff had failed to 
file a claim against the defendant according to a 
state statute and on that ground reversed the lower 
court's decision. In response to the argument that 
the statute had not run because of the continuing 
nature of the damage, the court stated: 
"Where the time and extent of injury are 
uncertain, a statutory period of limitation 
begins to run when the fact that damage is 
occurring becomes apparent and discoverable, 
even though the extent of the damage may still 
be unknown." Id. at 721. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS• MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiffs-Appellantsf original complaint 
was filed in August of 1974. The original plaintiffs were 
the Waltons. (R-l and 2). Subsequently on the 30th 
day of October, 1975, the plaintiffs sought to amend 
their complaint to join the Holbrooks as party plaintiffs. 
On November 10, 1975, Judge Croft granted plaintiffs-
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appellants' motion to amend their complaint (R-53). 
As indicated on Page Nine of plaintiffs-appellants' 
brief, the plaintiff-appellant, Holbrook, learned of 
the resurfacing of Summit Drive in the latter 
part of 1972 (deposition of Holbrook, pages 9-10). 
As indicated in the previous arguments, the plaintiffs-
appellants failed to file their appropriate notice of 
claim within the prescribed time. In Point II, it is 
stated that Summit Drive was completed in September of 1972. 
In Section 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953) , the Statute of Limitations with respect to 
injuries to real property is three years. Following 
this to its logical conclusion, the Statute of Limi-
tations would run as of September of 1975. In the 
instant case the plaintiffs-appellants, Holbrooks, 
did not seek to intervene in the lawsuit until 
October 30, 1975. (R-48), This would mean the 
plaintiffs-appellants, Holbrooks, were at least 30 
days beyond the three year Statute of Limitatic n in 
which to commence their action. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE WHICH WAS FILED BY THE 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, SUMMIT COUNTY. 
The third-party defendant-respondent, 
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Summit County, filed their motion to change the 
place of trial to Summit County (R-67 and 111). 
In both of these motions, the District Court refused 
to change the place of the trial to Summit County. 
Section 78-13-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953) as amended, requires that injuries to real 
property must be tried in the county in which the cause 
of action arises. It is apparent from plaintiffs-
appellants1 complaint (R-l) that the property in 
question is located in Summit County. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge James Sawaya correctly applied the 
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act and because 
of the plaintiffs-appellants failure to comply therewith, 
justifiably granted the defendant-respondent's motion 
for summary judgment. Also that Judge Jeppson erred in 
not granting defendant-respondent's motion to dismiss 
since the State of Utah has not waived its sovereign 
immunity with respect to actions of this type. 
It is for these reasons the Supreme Court 
should uphold the decision of the District Court 
and affirm the ruling of the Honorable Judge James Sawaya. 
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